New Times, Old Beliefs: Projecting the Future Size of Religions in Austria by Goujon, A. et al.
VIENNA INSTITUTE
OF DEMOGRAPHY
Working Papers
New Times, Old Beliefs: Projecting
 the Future Size of Religions in Austria 
Anne Goujon, Vegard Skirbekk, Katrin Fliegenschnee, Pawel Strzelecki
Vienna Institute of Demography
Austrian Academy of Sciences
Prinz Eugen-Straße 8-10 · A-1040 Vienna · Austria
E-Mail: vid@oeaw.ac.at
Website: www.oeaw.ac.at/vid
01 / 2006
Abstract 
 
Projecting the religious composition of the population is relevant for several reasons. It is a 
key characteristic influencing several aspects of individual behaviour, including marriage 
and childbearing patterns. The religious composition is also a driver of social cohesion and 
increased religious diversity could imply a more fragmented society. In this context, 
Austria finds itself in a period of transition where the long-time dominant Roman-Catholic 
church faces a serious decline in membership, while other groups, particularly the seculars 
and the Muslims, increase their influence. We project religions in Austria until 2051 by 
considering relative fertility rates, religion-specific net migration, and the rate of 
conversion between religions and transmission of religious beliefs from parents to children. 
We find that the proportion of Roman Catholics is likely to decrease from 75% in 2001 to 
less than 50% by the middle of the century, unless current trends in fertility, secularisation 
or immigration are to change. The share of Protestants is estimated to reach a level 
between 3 and 5% in 2051. The most uncertain projections are for those without religious 
affiliation: they could number as little as 10% and as many as 33%. The Muslim 
population—which grew from 1% in 1981 to 4% in 2001—will, according to our 
estimates, represent 14 to 26% of the population by 2051. If current fertility trends remain 
constant, Islam could represent the majority religion for those below 15 years of age in 
2051. Other religion categories are estimated to constitute 7-12% of the population by 
2051. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
Austria, religion, projections, Catholics, secularization, Muslim, migration 
 
 
Authors 
 
Anne Goujon is a research scholar at the Vienna Institute of Demography of the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences, and a researcher in the World Population Project at the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
 
Vegard Skirbekk is a researcher in the World Population Project at the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
 
Katrin Fliegenschnee is a research scholar at the Vienna Institute of Demography of the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences. 
 
Pawel Strzelecki is a researcher at the Institute of Statistics and Demography at the 
Warsaw School of Economics 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We would like to thank Statistics Austria for providing the data, and Amela Ajonavic, 
Caroline Berghammer, Dalkhat Ediev, Marianne Fliegenschnee, Joshua Goldstein and 
Wolfgang Lutz for making valuable comments; Sylvia Trnka for editing the first version of 
this paper and Werner Richter for editing the final version. We would also like to thank the 
participants of the UNU-ECE Meeting in Vienna in September 2005 for asking the right 
questions. 
 2
New Times, Old Beliefs:  
Projecting the Future Size of Religions in Austria 
 
Anne Goujon, Vegard Skirbekk, Katrin Fliegenschnee, Pawel Strzelecki 
 
 
1. Religions in Austria: The past, the Present, the Prospects 
 
Austria was in the past—as it is today—predominantly Roman-Catholic, though several 
religious minorities, in particular Jewish and Orthodox communities, have existed for 
many centuries. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, following the reformation, 
many Austrians converted to Protestantism, though the Habsburg emperors remained 
Roman Catholic. The Counter-Reformation, lead by Ferdinand II around 1600, had the 
effect that Austria again become almost exclusively Roman-Catholic. It was only on the 
force of the Tolerance Patent enacted by Joseph II in 1781 that Protestant, Orthodox 
Christian and Jewish faiths ceased to be forbidden. (Reingrabner 1981; Bundespressedienst 
2004). However, most Austrians remained Roman-Catholic, and the 1869 census reveals 
that the proportion Catholics varied between 94.8% and 99.8%, depending on the region of 
the country1 (Flora 1983). 
 
 In 1900 about 92% of Austria’s population was Roman-Catholic, as shown in Table 
1. During the twentieth century substantial religious change took place, and by 2001, the 
share of Roman Catholics had decreased to 74%. The main reason for the change in beliefs 
in Austria was the high degree of secularisation. Immigration of individuals with other 
religions and the differences in fertility levels between religious groups also contributed to 
the phenomenon, but to a lesser extent than secularisation. The main changes took place 
late in the twentieth century, and whereas in 1971, 93% of the Austrian population were 
either Roman-Catholic or Protestant, this share dropped to only 78% by 2001. During the 
same period, the share of those without religious affiliation rose from 4 to 12%, the 
Muslim community from 0 to 4% and other religious groups from 3 to 5%2.  
 
Table 1. Resident population Austria by religion 1900-2001  
 
Year 
Roman- 
Catholic 
(%) 
Protestant 
(%) 
Muslim 
(%) 
Other Religion
(%) 
Without
Religion
(%) 
Unknown
(%) 
Total 
(absolute) 
1900 91.6 2.7 0.0 5.4 0.2 0.2 6003780 
1971 87.4 6.0 0.3 1.5 4.3 0.6 7491526 
1981 84.3 5.6 1.0 2.0 6.0 1.0 7555338 
1991 78.0 5.0 2.0 2.9 8.6 3.5 7795786 
2001 73.6 4.7 4.2 3.5 12.0 2.0 8032926 
Source: Statistics Austria, Census 1900, Census 1971, Census 1981, Census 1991, and Census 2001 
 
                                                 
1 Includes only regions on the present territory of the Austrian Republic, not the entire Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.  
2 We divide the population into five main categories: Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Other 
religions, and individuals without religion. 
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 Table 2 shows the religious groups by age. The Roman Catholics is the largest 
religion for all age groups. The bulk of those without any religion is aged 30-60 years. As 
discussed in section 4.4, many are not members of the Roman-Catholic church in active 
labour market years. However, they seem to be re-entering the church as they age beyond 
60, based on observations from our longitudinal data. One potential explanation is that they 
are more reluctant to pay taxes in peak-income years.3 
 
Table 2. Share of population by age and religion in Austria in 1981, 1991, and 2001 
 
  Roman-
Catholic 
Protestant Muslim Other 
religions 
Without 
religions 
Population
Population 6372645 423162 76939 230553 452039 7555338
0-9 88.7 4.7 2.0 2.8 1.8 910515
10-19 91.5 5.0 0.9 1.7 0.9 1258231
20-29 86.0 5.2 1.4 3.7 3.6 1124280
30-39 80.0 6.2 1.8 4.6 7.3 1016078
40-49 82.4 5.7 1.0 3.4 7.4 903131
50-59 80.2 6.0 0.3 2.8 10.6 889445
60-69 79.7 6.4 0.1 2.5 11.3 657617
19
81
 
70+ 81.8 6.1 0.0 2.9 9.2 796041
Population 6081454 388709 158776 494596 672251 7795786
0-9 83.9 4.2 3.3 5.5 3.2 915017
10-19 85.1 4.5 3.2 5.1 2.1 944238
20-29 79.2 4.5 2.8 7.2 6.2 1347278
30-39 75.0 4.6 2.6 8.3 9.4 1153678
40-49 71.5 5.6 2.1 7.7 13.2 1008043
50-59 76.1 5.3 1.0 5.5 12.2 862804
60-69 75.6 5.6 0.2 4.9 13.7 790436
19
91
 
70+ 77.7 6.1 0.1 5.2 10.8 774292
Population 5915421 376150 338988 439104 963263 8032926
0-9 76.5 4.2 8.1 5.8 5.4 879759
10-19 81.4 4.2 6.0 4.7 3.7 957680
20-29 73.5 4.1 6.3 6.4 9.6 1011808
30-39 70.7 4.3 5.0 6.4 13.7 1373153
40-49 70.0 4.5 3.8 6.6 15.1 1150990
50-59 67.7 5.3 2.5 6.1 18.5 966800
60-69 74.8 5.2 1.0 3.7 15.3 783653
20
01
 
70+ 77.2 6.0 0.2 2.9 13.6 909083
Source: Statistics Austria, Census 2001, Census 1991, and Census 1981. 
 
 In this study, we project the future religious composition in Austria using a set of 
scenarios that take into account age-specific fertility, migration and secularisation. We 
base our estimates on a rich set of data covering the entire Austrian population from 1981 
to 2001. The dataset allows us to estimate age-, sex- and religion-specific migration and 
fertility in addition to rates of conversion between religions.  
                                                 
3 Austria has special tax regulations for Catholics and Protestants. People have to pay “church taxes” directly 
to the church. The Roman-Catholic church automatically receives 1.1% of the net pre-tax income, while the 
members of the Protestant Church have to pay 1.5% of the self-reported income. Muslims do not pay taxes 
but are encouraged to dedicate gifts to their religious community. 
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 Our projections for Austria 2001 to 2051 indicate that the proportion of Roman 
Catholics is likely to decrease from 75% in 2001 to less than 50% by the middle of the 
century, unless current trends in fertility, secularisation or immigration change. The share 
of Protestants is estimated to reach a level between 3 and 5% in 2051. The most uncertain 
projections are for those without religious affiliation: they could number as little as 10% 
and as many as 33%. The Muslim population—which grew from 1% in 1981 to 4% in 
2001—will, according to our estimates, represent 14 to 26% of the population by 2051.  
 
 
                                                
2. Data Collection on Religions and Projections 
 
In addition to Austria, countries such as India, Israel, Canada and United Kingdom include 
religion in their censuses (Statistics Austria 2003; Statistics India 2001; Statistics Israel 
2004; Statistics Canada 2001; Statistics United Kingdom 2001). Among the countries that 
omit the question about religious affiliation in their censuses, some consider it a violation 
of personal freedom.4 
 
Survey data from the United States suggest that the proportion of Protestants in the 
United States decreased strongly over time (Smith and Kim 2004). Their share of the 
population fell below 50% in 2004, which is the first time that Protestants are in minority 
in the United States.  
 
 Detailed projections on the population by religion are rare, and to our knowledge, 
no earlier projection of religions based on a complete census takes into account both 
differential fertility, migration, conversion rates as well as the impact of mixed-religious 
marriages on children’s religion.  
 
 Fliegenschnee et al. (2004) project the future size of the Protestant population in 
Austria. They foresee a substantial decrease, partly because of secularisation and partly 
because of the conversion of children of mixed couples (where one partner is non-
protestant). The analysis reveals substantial differences especially between the capital 
Vienna and other regions in the rate of secularisation, where secularisation trends in 
Vienna are much stronger. 
 Barret et al. (2001) contains extrapolations for the size of religions in most 
countries in the world. Barret et al.’s Austrian projection suggested that Christians will 
continue to decline, perhaps falling as low as 75% by 2050. This finding clearly contrasts 
 
4 In the United States, the question on religion was collected from religious organisations in the beginning of 
the 20th century, but, for privacy reasons, the law prohibits the United States Bureau of the Census from 
asking a question on religious affiliation on a mandatory basis. Other countries, such as Nigeria, omit the 
census “since each religious and ethnic group would prefer numerical superiority over the other, it might be 
safer to ignore religion and ethnicity since there would be the temptation by each group to explore ways to 
have an edge over the other”, according to the head of the National Population Commission, Samaila 
Makama (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2005).  
In Austria, there is a question on religion in the census but the information is not available to church tax 
authorities. The Catholic and Protestant churches collect the taxes by themselves. Hence, there are always 
more Roman Catholics and Protestants in the census than in the churches’ statistics. However the difference 
is minimal e.g., 5.89 millions Roman Catholics have registered by the Church in 2001 whereas the census 
counted 5.92 millions. 
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our results, which may be due to the fact that they are based on findings from the 1991 
census, and that their projection is less detailed. According to our projection, the share of 
Christians decreases below 75% for all scenarios. 
 
 Projections were also made in Switzerland in the framework of a larger study on the 
demographic characteristics of linguistic and religious groups in Switzerland (Haug and 
Wanner 2000). The authors only consider three religious groups, Catholics, Protestants, 
and “other religions”. The implies that secularization trends and changes in other religions 
are overlooked, as the “other religions” contains a range of different faiths in addition to 
secularised individuals. 
 
 
3. Religious Determinants of Demographic Events 
 
Regulating sexuality and fertility is central in the teachings of most major religions, and 
religious beliefs are powerful determinants of marriage, childbearing, divorce and other 
events related to family formation and dissolution. Examples of such rules are those 
regulating the minimum age at first sexual union, the number of wives or whether non-
marital childbearing is prohibited. Such forces can influence the changing religious 
composition of a population over time, and could affect relative fertility rates, religion-
specific net migration, and the rate of conversion between religions and transmission of 
religious beliefs from parents to children. 
 
 The religions differ in their emphasis on marital obligations, divorce rights, fertility 
demands and individual self-determination. As Figure 1 shows, religion could affect 
demographic patterns both due to directly expressed doctrines (e.g., that religious leaders 
forbids contraceptive) or indirect suggestions (e.g., promotion of early marriages which 
can lead to higher fertility). Moreover, beliefs expressed by religious leaders and religious 
texts matter only as long as the population is receptive and submissive to religious 
teachings. 
 
Figure 1. Influences of religion on demographic behaviour 
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 Studies looking at the effects of religion are prone to be upwards biased if variables 
that are associated with, although not caused by, religious beliefs affect demographic 
behaviour (Sander 1992). Religious influence tends to be contextual and often mixed with 
politics and ideologies, to an extent that religions’ effects can rarely be estimated without 
considering a religious groups’ social, geographic and economic circumstances. Poverty, 
low education levels, resource availability and political stability may be the cause of 
demographic behaviour, and not necessarily religion (Cohen 1996). Nevertheless, although 
controlling for other factors softens the estimated influence of religious beliefs, religions is 
still often found to have an independent effect on various demographic and economic 
outcomes (Lehrer 2005). Furthermore, religious beliefs can affect education, income and 
political stability, and hence assuming that such variables are fully exogenous could imply 
that the religion effects are biased downwards. 
 
 Definition of adherence to religious groups is a tricky issue as well, as some 
individuals may be intensely religious, while others are uncertain whether to define 
themselves as religious or not. Most datasets on religion are based on surveys, and very 
few contain the whole population. Surveys can be biased as it is may be difficult to get a 
representative sample of a nation’s population with respect to religious affiliation. The 
Austrian dataset used in this study may overcome problems associated with potentially 
biased surveys, as it is based on census information for the complete Austrian population, 
rather than a small sub-sample of the population. 
 
 Further, although bivariate analyses suggest there are differences in mortality rates 
between individuals adhering to different religions, it is uncertain whether this relation is 
causal. Studies that control for confounding factors find that differences in mortality by 
religion are much smaller or insignificant (Hummer et al. 2004; Strawbridge et al. 2000). It 
is also highly uncertain if any such longevity differences will remain over time. We 
therefore assume equal life expectancy between members of different religions. 
 
 
3.1. Fertility 
  
We describe below the religious beliefs and practices in the order of their size in the 
Austrian population from the 2001 census. Hence, we describe the religious beliefs and 
practices first of the Roman-Catholics, then of the Protestants and finally of the Muslims. 
Understanding differences in fertility patterns between religious groups is important as 
they have a reinforcing effect over time on the size of the different religions (lower/higher 
fertility leads to smaller/larger groups which in turn have fewer/more children).  
 
 The Bible encourages high fertility. It states (Bible, Gen 1:28), “And God blessed 
them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth”. The only 
permitted form of contraception in the Catholic church is the “calendar method” where one 
does not have sex on the days of the month with the highest conception risk. However, 
pronatalist measures may have been listened to among Christians historically. However, in 
contemporary western Christian populations, only a minority believe the church should 
influence family decisions and Church attendance is low and decreasing (Berghammer 
2003). 
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 Sander (1992) analyses American Roman Catholics born during the twentieth century 
and finds that from 1920 and onwards, they no longer had higher fertility than the 
protestant majority, but had adopted the same fertility patterns. This may be caused by the 
fact that despite the clear opposition to contraception and abortion of the Roman-Catholic 
church, as many as 87% of American Catholics believe that individual choice should 
prevail in family formation choices (Noonan 1986). Also, Roman-Catholic European 
countries are currently well represented among those with “lowest-low fertility” (total 
fertility rate below 1.3), including Spain and Italy (United Nations 2004). 
 
 The Protestant church does not have the same hierarchical structure as Catholicism5. 
As the role of the church and religious leaders are generally weaker among Protestants 
(partly because of the emphasis on a direct relation to God), independent interpretation of 
the Bible and self-determination of faith has become central for this group. Protestants 
disfavour contraception and condom use to a much lower extent than other religious 
groups. In contrast to the Catholic church (which is based on Bible and tradition), a 
Protestant looks to the Bible for answers to religious questions. As a consequence there are 
no universal binding clerical teachings on topics such as contraception, cohabitation or 
abortion, all of which are seen as private decisions. Protestant churches across countries 
are rather autonomous e.g. the Protestant church in Austria is mainly liberal orientated: 
acceptance of divorce and out-of-wedlock fertility as well as accepting female heads of 
church are more, and have been sooner, accepted than in most other religions. The 
Protestant church recognises divorce and allows its followers to dissolve unions if marriage 
cannot be continued (Miklas 2005).  
 
 Islam is supportive of family formation, where marriage and childbearing represent 
central elements in the religion. Muhammad strongly supported marriage, remarriage and 
fertility. He endorsed polygyny as a way of allowing widowed fecund women the 
opportunity to have children, which would increase the number of his followers and 
strengthen the religion: “Marry women who are loving and very prolific for I shall 
outnumber the peoples by you” (al-Masabih 1963). Additionally, a hadith states, that on 
the day of resurrection, the Prophet would be proud of the number of his community 
compared with other communities and that he admonishes his followers to reproduce and 
increase in number (Bakar 1998). Implications of Islam for fertility patterns may be 
stronger than for Christians as mosque attendance seems to be relatively high, and the bond 
between the individual and the religious community relatively strong. Muslims have 
relatively high fertility in a number of societies and many Muslims attribute their high 
fertility to their religion (Borooah 2004; McQuillan 2004; Reynolds and Tanner 1995). 
  
 At the same time, most Muslims in Austria are first or second-generation immigrants, 
and the fertility of immigrants tend to converge towards the host country fertility patterns 
over time (Nahmias 2004; Ram and George 1990). However, as e.g. Abbasi-Shawazi 
                                                 
5 The Protestant Church lacks a central authority and there is a large degree of autonomy even at lower levels 
in the church hierarchy. The Protestant church relies on Luther’s principles of Sola Fide, Sola Christus, Sola 
Gratia and Sola Scriptura (Only Faith, Only Christ, Only Grace and only the Scripture), and takes the Bible 
as its source in religious questions. Both men and women can become priests, cohabitation is allowed, and so 
is divorce and remarriage.  
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(1998) shows when studying immigrants in Australia, the fertility trends and levels in the 
country of origin also influence the immigrants’ fertility levels. 
 
There do not seem to exist any specific doctrinal prohibitions of contraception in 
Islam, which is supported by surveys of religious leaders and religious writings for 
example in Jordan (Underwood 2000). It is difficult to identify the official view due to the 
lack of a universal religious hierarchy. There is considerable support among many 
religious leaders for certain family planning practices, such as coitus interruptus or 
contraceptive pills, while substantial opposition exists against abortion and sterilisation 
(Chamie 1981; Simmons 2003). However, the Koran also includes advice that reduces 
fertility, including long nursing periods, which substantially decreases conception rates. 
Children should, according to the Koran, be nursed for two full years (Koran, Sura 2,233). 
 
 
3.2. Marriage 
 
Marriage is the only permitted form of living together and sexual unions for Catholics. The 
Roman-Catholic church describes marriage as a sacrament between a man and a woman 
originally founded by God (Catechism of the Catholic church 2005: 1603). The marriage 
consists of “conjugal fidelity, offspring, and the unbreakable union between the spouses.” 
(Martos 1997)  
 
 The Bible, influencing the views of both Catholics and Protestants, emphasises the 
link between leaving the parental home and forming a marriage; “That is why a man leaves 
his father and mother and unites with his wife, and they become a new family.” (Bible, 
Gen 2,24). Hence, the church encourages leaving home, marrying and founding a new 
family.  
 
 In Islam, marriage has a very high significance. Fitzgerald et al. (1976) argue that 
“The Koran demands that every healthy believer has to marry.” Muhammad says in the 
traditions (al-Massabih 1963), “Those of you who can support a wife should marry, for it 
keeps you from looking at strange women and preserves you from immorality”. Polygamy 
is often mentioned in the Koran (e.g., Koran, Sura 4:3), where a man is allowed to marry 
up to four wives if he can do justice between them all. However, when there is a difference 
between Islamic and public law, Western Muslim organisations such as the “Zentralrat der 
Muslime in Deutschland” argue that one should follow the laws of the country as long as it 
does not contradict Islamic law. 
 
 
3.3. Divorce 
 
In Catholic church, there is no divorce, only nullification of marriage. “… [T]he Church 
maintains that a new union cannot be recognised as valid, if the first marriage was. If the 
divorced are remarried civilly, they find themselves in a situation that objectively 
contravenes God’s law.”(Catechism of the Catholic church 2005: 1650) People can have 
their marriage nullified, for example if the vow of fidelity was broken or if they can show 
that one partner was not willing to get children (Veitschegger 2004). 
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 Unlike the Catholic church, marriage is not a sacrament for Protestants, it is possible 
to divorce and remarry. Of course family and marriage are part of the Protestant faith. 
However, central in Protestant teachings is a merciful God who will forgive mistakes 
(Miklas 2005), which implies that divorces are a possibility.  
 
 The Koran describes rules for divorce, and Mohammed characterised divorce as “the 
thing most hated by God”. It may be particularly difficult for women to cancel marriages, 
which may partly explain Muslims’ lower divorce rates (Fitzgerald et al. 1976). 
 
 
3.4. Interreligious Marriage and Transmission of Religion to Children 
 
Whether intra-religious marriages are accepted—and under what conditions—is another 
important aspect, which determines the relative survival rate of a religion. To which degree 
religion is transmitted from parents to children is also of fundamental importance to the 
long-term development of a religion. Some religions encourage strict upbringing of 
children and leave little opportunity to leave their religion. Others are more tolerant and 
allow people to exit the church, without being subject to sanctions. 
 
Table 3. Marriage by religion according to the religion of bride and groom in 2003 
 
The bride 
Religious denomination of: Roman- 
Catholic Protestant Muslim
Other 
 religion
Without 
religion 
Roman-Catholic 77.3 56.2 8.9 36.4 30.8 
Protestant 3.7 15.7 1.0 2.3 3.0 
Muslim 3.9 4.6 83.6 4.5 4.6 
Other religion 1.7 1.7 1.1 40.5 2.9 Th
e 
gr
oo
m
 
Without religion 13.4 21.8 5.4 16.4 57.9 
Source: Statistics Austria 2003 
 
 For members of the Roman-Catholic church in Austria, the impact of mixed 
marriages is not that important as almost 80% of Roman Catholics get married to a 
Roman-Catholic partner and their children are given the same religion (as shown in Table 
3). The picture is however very different for the Protestant population where 80% of 
Austrian Protestants marry a non-Protestant partner, mostly a Roman-Catholic (56%) or a 
person without religion (22%). Lutz and Uljas-Lutz (1998) estimated that only half of the 
children of these couples become Protestant. 
  
 Table 2 reveals that for the smaller religious groups, there are generally fewer who 
marry individuals from their own religion. The exception is for Muslims, where only 16% 
marry an individual from another religion, which could be because intra-religious 
marriages are discouraged in Islam (Fitzgerald et al. 1976). For members of other religious 
groups around 60% get married to a person of another religion. Many individuals from 
other religions (36%) marry a Roman-Catholic. A little more than 40% of people without 
religion get married to a religious partner.  
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3.5. Acceptance of Conversion to Other Religions and Secularisation 
 
Most religions have a negative outlook on those who leave their faith. The largest group of 
church leavers are those who go away from religion as such, as large proportions of 
individuals in Western societies have decided to substitute their religious beliefs with 
secular views. (Schluchter 1991)6 
 
 Our hypothesis is that as a result of this secularisation, which became a mass 
movement in the late 1960s, active participation in the churches was reduced. The decline 
of Roman Catholics is a typical European phenomenon. In Latin America and Africa, the 
number of Roman Catholics is expected to increase, while “only one European country 
(France) appears in the top 25 in terms of growth, at the 22nd for the 2004-2025 period.” 
(Saenz 2004)  
 
 There are religious determinants for leaving church for good as well as for the 
transmission of religion from parents to children. For example the Protestant attitude 
concerning children is deduced from the Bible, especially from Jesus’ behaviour and 
teaching towards children: “Let the little children come to me and do not try to stop them, 
for the kingdom of God belongs to such as these.” (Bible, Mark 10,14)  
 
 In Islam, leaving one’s religion (apostasy) is strongly opposed, and can be 
sanctioned. Some Muslim organisations promote a more tolerant view, where also the right 
to convert should be allowed without penalties (Ahmad Faiz bin Abdul Rahman 1998; 
Rahman 1986).  
 
 
4. Projections 
 
The projections of the population by religion status from 2001 to 2051 were created using 
the PDE Population Software7, a simplified multi-state population projections program for 
states interacting with one another. The inputs required for the projections are the 
following: 
 
- Base year parameters: population by age, sex, and religion status, age- and religion-
specific fertility rates, age-, sex- and religion-specific mortality rates, age-, sex- and 
                                                 
6 Secularisation has been part of Austrian philosophy since the age of enlightenment (Schluchter 1991). The 
church is losing its exclusive right to settle the norms, because there are other value systems, which can guide 
one’s beliefs and lifestyle. “The result of the secularisation is that faith is getting more and more subjective as 
a consequence of alternative lifestyles.” (Schluchter 1991) Many spheres such as economy, policy, and 
science are not under the control of the church any more (Schluchter 1991; Zulehner 1993). 
More and more people are leaving the church because they find their moral concepts somewhere else and 
individuals are largely free to choose which view fits best for them (Schluchter 1991). Today we can say we 
have two tendencies, „the religion’s view of the world views only part of the world, and faith is subjective.” 
(Schluchter 1991) But also the possible religious views have become more multifarious. People have access 
to different religions, even within the Christian church or the Islamic world (Schloz et al. 2003). 
7 The software is available free of charge at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pub/software.html 
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religion-specific net migration numbers, and transition rates between religion 
groups. 
- Scenario assumptions as to the future of the parameters listed above. 
 
Table 4. Definition of the religion categories used in the projections 
 
Categories Census categories 
Roman-Catholic Roman-Catholic church 
Protestant Protestant church 
Muslim Islamic religious community 
Other religion Other Catholic (united) churches 
Orthodox churches  
Other Christian communities  
Jewish religious community  
Other non-Christian communities 
Not indicated  
Others (before 2001) 
Without religion Individuals who declare no religious affiliation 
 
The base-year population was taken from the 2001 census. As mentioned above, we 
aggregated the population into five main religion categories: Roman Catholics, Protestants, 
Muslims, Other religions, and Without Religion. A definition of the categories is given in 
Table 4.  
 
 
4.1. Base-year Fertility  
 
The base-year fertility is estimated from the census data on children ever born to women 
residing in Austria in 1981, 1991 and 2001.  
 
 The methodology for calculating age-specific fertility differentials by religion is 
detailed in Appendix 1. Tables 5 and 6 as well as Figures 2a-2f present the main results. In 
the period 1981-2001, the TFR in Austria declined from 1.7 to 1.3. Fertility declined for all 
religious affiliations. In absolute terms, the largest decrease of the TFR was observed 
among Muslims (by about 0.8), and the lowest among “other religions” (by about 0.3). The 
total number of children born in Austria was most strongly influenced by the declining 
fertility among Roman-Catholics who constitute the major part of the Austrian population. 
The increasing number of persons without religious affiliation who have a significantly 
lower fertility than other groups also influenced the total decrease. The analysis also 
reveals that the population without religion had a very low fertility throughout the period 
observed with a TFR of 1.1 children in 1981 and 0.9 in 2001.  
 
Detailed analysis by age (see the figures 2a-2f) shows two main tendencies in all 
religion groups: postponement of the age of having children and the decline in total fertility 
rates. The postponement of having children was common to all groups except the Muslim 
population who in 2001 still had higher age-specific fertility rates at age 20-24 than those 
aged 25-29. The changes in the ASFR among religions had two main patterns. The Roman-
Catholic and Protestant populations in the first period 1981-1991 postponed the main age 
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period of childbearing from 20-24 to 25-29. Then in the second period 1991-2001 the 
postponement of fertility continued (higher fertility at age 30+) but the stronger trend was 
the huge fertility decline at ages 20-30. 
 
Table 5. TFR and proportion by religion in the female population aged 15-49 
 
 1981 1991 2001 
 TFR  Proportion  TFR ProportionTFR  Proportion
Roman-Catholic 1.70 85.7 1.52 78.8 1.32 74.5 
Protestant 1.51 5.8 1.37 5.1 1.21 4.5 
Islam 3.09 0.9 2.77 1.9 2.34 4.6 
Other religion 1.70 3.4 1.61 7.1 1.44 6.2 
Without religion1.12 4.2 1.04 7.1 0.86 10.2 
Total 1.67 100 1.51 100 1.33 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Statistics Austria Datenbank ISIS 
 
The results show that the fertility patterns of different religion groups tend to follow 
similar trends, albeit at different times and with different scales. The sources of the 
differences in fertility patterns beside the impact of religion on sexual behaviour are also 
other features correlated with religion that diversify the women, like education level, 
immigration status or labour market participation.  
 
Table 6. Fertility differentials by religion, 2001  
 
 Roman- 
Catholic Protestant Muslim
Other 
 religion
Without 
religion 
15-19 0.056 0.058 0.174 0.168 0.069 
20-24 0.261 0.228 0.843 0.452 0.217 
25-29 0.465 0.417 0.811 0.484 0.244 
30-34 0.376 0.350 0.318 0.213 0.206 
35-39 0.135 0.130 0.148 0.095 0.104 
40-44 0.024 0.025 0.042 0.029 0.023 
45-49 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
TFR 1.32 1.21 2.34 1.44 0.86 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Statistics Austria Datenbank ISIS 
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Figures 2a-2f. Age-specific fertility rates of the total population and of different religion 
groups in Austria in the period 1981-2001 
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4.2 Base-year Mortality 
 
Mortality differentials by religion were not considered in this project, as the data are not 
available, the religion of the deceased not being entered in the death register. Although it 
would be possible to link the census data to the death register, this was not feasible in the 
framework of this survey. Mortality rates are extracted from life tables available at 
Statistics Austria and are kept equal across all religious affiliations (Statistics Austria 
2003) 
 
 
4.3 Base-year Migration 
 
Migration is a key factor in Austria’s changing religious landscape. Unfortunately we lack 
data on the faith of immigrants and/or emigrants in Austria. Religious affiliation was 
inferred from the country of origin. In a first step, we selected the countries with the 
highest in- and out-migration and retrieved the net numbers of migrants for them. In a 
second step, we used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-World Factbook (2005) that 
gives statistics on all the countries in the world to retrieve the shares of the population by 
religious affiliations. These shares were then applied to the flows to distribute the net 
migrating population according to religious beliefs as shown in Table 7. The exercise 
shows that in 2001, 18% of the migrants were Roman Catholics, 8% were Protestants, 38% 
were Muslims, 28% followed another religion, and 9% are without religion. Figure 3 
shows the age composition of the migrants by religion. The assumption that the migrants 
have the same distribution as the rest of the population in their country of origin is, of 
course, quite daring. In certain cases, ethnic or religious conflicts could affect outbound 
migration of a specifically persecuted group. However, in the absence of better 
information, this was felt to be the best approximation method. 
 
Table 7. Share of population by religion in the main countries of net-migration to Austria 
 
Country of origin Roman- 
Catholic Protestant Muslim 
Other  
religion 
Without 
religion 
Bosnia Herzegov. 15  40 45  
China 3  2  95 
Croatia 88 0 1 6 5 
Egypt   94 6  
Germany 34 34 4 16 12 
Hungary 52 16 1 17 14 
India 2  13 85  
Iran   98 2  
Macedonia 1 a  17 82  
Pakistan 1  97 2  
Poland 90   10  
Serbia 4 1 19 76  
Switzerland 42 35 4 8 11 
Turkey   99.8 0.2  
Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2005) 
a Source: http://www.Catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc1.html  
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Figure 3. Age structure of net migration by religious affiliation  
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4.4 Base-year Transitions 
 
The transitions measure the flows occurring between religions, meaning moving from one 
religious affiliation to another one. The transitions in Austria from 1991 to 2003 are given 
in Table 8. Out of the twenty flows possible between the five religion categories, two seem 
essential and will shape the future composition of the religions landscape of the country. 
 
Table 8. Annual Conversion Flows of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and all other 
religions, 1991-2003 
 
Flow Religion 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Roman Catholics 33914 35845 43527 32195 43632 33863 39588
Protestants 3641 2902 2843 2694 3468 3062 3193Exit 
Other religions 221 134 165 166 162 157 118
Roman Catholics 4372 3709 3792 4017 3387 3801 3848
Protestants 873 869 1024 838 1015 765 779Entrance 
Other religions 598 372 374 361 365 679 543
Roman Catholics -29542 -32136 -39735 -28178 -40245 -30062 -35740
Protestants -2768 -2033 -1819 -1856 -2453 -2297 -2414Net  Other religions 377 238 209 195 203 522 425
Source: Statistics Austria Yearbooks, 1992 to 2005. 
 
 Those flows reflect the progressing secularisation of the country, especially through 
the exodus of members of the Roman-Catholic church. These were estimated to be around 
34,000 on average per year for the period 2001-2006. About 2,200 are moving out of the 
Protestant church every year for the same period. Abandonment of religion is much harder 
in other religions such as Islam, the Jewish faith, and Hinduism. Changes in the Muslim 
and ‘other’ religious categories will occur mainly through fertility and migration. 
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 The age patterns of transition, shown in Figure 4, were calculated based on 
comparison between censuses 1981-1991 and 1991-2001 using the estimates of net-
migration by age for sub-national population applying the census survival rate method8. 
 
Figure 4. Age pattern of secularisation rates (in percentage) for Roman Catholics and 
Protestants, male and female, 2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
4.5 Scenarios 
 
The scenarios should help in answering the main questions we have about the future of 
religions in Austria: 
 
Question 1: If secularisation and the increase of other religions in the population 
continue, when will the Roman Catholics become a minority? 
Question 2: Will Islam or those without religion become the dominant group in 
Austria? 
Question 3: What is the influence of migration on the religious structure of the 
country? 
Question 4: Could a change in the religious composition lead to increased fertility 
in Austria? 
 
We developed a matrix of thirty-six scenarios emerging from the combination of 
several hypotheses on the different demographic determinants and the determinants of 
religious compositional change that is fertility, migration, and transition/secularisation. 
 
                                                 
8 Calculated with the help of the U.S. Census Bureau Population Analysis spreadsheets (PAS). 
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Fertility9:   Scenario “stable fertility” (Fs): Fertility by religion remains constant at the 
levels observed in 2001. Hence, the Muslim population keeps at a higher fertility level than 
the rest of the population with a TFR above 2.3 children per woman. This scenario is 
coherent with the hypothesis that dependents (mainly wives) of new migrants may rely on 
child benefits rather than on employment, and therefore keep a somehow higher fertility.10 
This scenario also implies that the secularised population maintains its very low fertility, 
which may be unlikely in a situation of diffusion where more and more people move to this 
group, coming from different fertility backgrounds. 
  
  Scenario “converging fertility” (Fc): Fertility by religion converges to a TFR of 1.4 
children by 2026-2031, and remains constant afterwards. This TFR is in accordance with 
the medium variant of the Austrian population projection. The convergence scenario 
implies three main assumptions. First, fertility in Austria will stay at very low levels at 
least until the middle of next century. Second, the different generations of migrants will 
rapidly adopt the low fertility pattern existing in Austria. And third, the population without 
any religion will increase its fertility.  
 
 Scenario “half-converging fertility” (Fh): This scenario provides an alternative 
between constant and converging fertility. Fertility starts converging but stops half way 
through on the way to convergence. In 2026-31, the TFR of Muslims will be 1.9 children, 
that of those without religion, 1.1 children. Population in the other religious affiliations 
gravitate around 1.4 children. As in scenario Fc, fertility remains constant at the above-
mentioned level during the 2031-2051 period. 
 
Mortality:  One single trend, following the medium variant of population projections 
for mortality of the Austrian Statistical Office (Statistics Austria 2003). All religions 
follow the same mortality pattern with an increase in life expectancy between 2001-2006 
and 2046-2051 from 76 to 83 years for male and from 82 to 88 for females.  
 
Migration:  Scenario “Medium migration” (Mm): The net number of migrants follows 
the medium variant for population projections of the Austrian Statistical Office. It 
fluctuates between 19,000 and 28,000 each year during the 2001-2051 period. The age and 
sex patterns of migrants follow those observed in 2001. The religions affiliation of 
migrants is kept at levels observed in 2001: 18% are Catholics, 8% are Protestants, 38% 
are Muslims, 28% have another religion and 9% are without religion. 
 
 Scenario “Muslim migration” (Mi): Same as in Mm except that the share of Muslims 
among migrants increases linearly up to 100% in the period 2026-31, and then remains 
                                                 
9 Children are born in the same category as their mother. This is consistent with several studies that show the 
mother is more influent for the choice of children’s religion, especially in the case of mixed marriages (Lutz 
1985). However, we do not consider what could happen within a more balanced religious composition of the 
country where the rate of mixed marriages may increase and affect the choice of one or no religion for the 
children. 
10 This scenario does not take into account tempo-effects, where postponement leads to a temporary increase 
in period fertility at later stages (see e.g. Sobotka 2004). The stable relatively high fertility among Muslims 
can be partly explained by the fact that parental leave in Austria since 2002 has been made available for all 
women, regardless of whether they had an employment contract before they get a child. (Bundesministerium 
für soziale Sicherheit 2005) 
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constant at this level. This scenario illustrates the relative influence of immigration of a 
specific group on the overall religious composition of the country. 
 
 Scenario “High migration” (Mh): Same as in Mm, except that the net number of 
migrants follows the high variant for migration stated in the population projections of the 
Austrian Statistical Office. The net number of migrants per year fluctuates between 27,000 
and 38,000 during the 2001-2051 period. 
 
Transition/Secularisation:   
 Scenario “Constant secularisation” (Tc): This scenario implies constant transition 
rates at the levels observed in 2001 for transitions from Catholics to ‘without religion’ and 
from Protestants to ‘without religion’ (as shown in Figure 5). In the 2001-2006 period, this 
means 34,000 are leaving the Roman-Catholic church and about 2,200 are leaving the 
Protestant church every year. This scenario mainly shows the depletion of the Roman-
Catholic and Protestant churches due to present trends in secularisation.  
 
 Scenario “High secularisation” (Th): The transition rates double between 2001-2006 
and 2026-2031 and remain constant afterwards. As in scenario Tc, the overall age pattern 
is kept constant. This shows a strengthening of the current trend where people are leaving 
the Protestant and Roman-Catholic churches.  
 
 Scenario “Low secularisation” (Tl): The transition rates converge to zero by 2026-
2031 so that by 2031, everybody stays in the religious groups he/she was born into. This 
scenario describes a reversal of the present trend over a rather long period of 25 years. 
 
 Scenario “Muslim secularisation (Tm): This scenario replicates scenario Tc and adds 
a possibility of a secularisation among the Muslim population. The transition rates of the 
Muslim population to secularisation equal that of the Roman Catholics in Scenario Tc. 
Because the concept of secularisation does not really apply to the Islamic world, where it is 
rather an exit from religion, it is meant in the sense of a state where individual life is no 
longer structured and determined by Islam, as observed in some North African countries 
and migrants from these regions to France (Akgüngör and Bayraktar 2005). 
 
The matrix of the 36 scenarios emerging from the combination of the hypothesis on 
the different demographic determinants is shown in Table 9. 
 
 
 4.6 Scenario Results 
 
We will look at three main indicators to reflect upon the changes induced by changes in the 
religious composition of the population. Although we are considering thirty-six scenarios, 
we will show that the results group themselves quite nicely around the main determinants 
of the indicators under consideration, above all secularisation trends and migration 
composition and levels. 
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Table 9. Matrix of scenarios 
 
Migration 
Fertility Transition/ Secularisation Medium  (Mm) 
Muslim  
(Mi) 
High  
(Mh) 
Constant (Tc) FsMmTc FsMiTc FsMhTc 
High (Th) FsMmTh FsMiTh FsMhTh 
Low (Tl) FsMmTl FsMiTl FsMhTl 
Stable 
(Fs) 
Muslim (Tm) FsMmTm FsMiTm FsMhTm 
Constant (Tc) FcMmTc FcMiTc FcMhTc 
High (Th) FcMmTh FcMiTh FcMhTh 
Low (Tl) FcMmTl FcMiTl FcMhTl 
Converging 
(Fc) 
Muslim (Tm) FcMmTm FcMiTm FcMhTm 
Constant (Tc) FhMmTc FhMiTc FhMhTc 
High (Th) FhMmTh FhMiTh FhMhTh 
Low (Tl) FhMmTl FhMiTl FhMhTl 
Half-converging  
(Fh) 
Muslim (Tm) FhMmTm FhMiTm FhMhTm
 
 
 
Population 
The Austrian population will start shrinking in all thirty-six scenarios, as shown in Figure 
5.  The time at which this will happen varies within the period from 2031 to 2051. Only in 
the case that combines stable fertility (Fs), high migration, and low secularisation would 
the population not start its decline before the middle of the century. The critical question is 
whether such a scenario is likely or not. We can identify two main groups of scenarios 
when looking across total population size results. The top group of scenarios leading to 
higher population growth is those combining high migration with the different fertility and 
transition scenarios. Religion will contribute to population growth if migrants keep having 
a differentiated pattern of fertility, especially regarding the fertility of the Muslim 
population. It is clear that unless there is high migration, the population will level off 
before 2030. 
  
Fertility 
In terms of total fertility rate, the range would vary between 1.4 and 1.7 children in 2046-
51, as shown in Figure 6. In case of constant fertility differentials within religious 
categories, the total fertility rate would still increase to 1.5 children because of the 
changing weights of the different religious categories with increasing weight of the more 
fertile groups (Muslims). The convergence of fertility scenario obviously leads to a smaller 
increase in fertility, to the target level of 1.4 children in 2026-32. 
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Figure 5. Austria’s total population, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios 
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Figure 6. Austria’s TFR, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios (Source: Authors’ calculations) 
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Religious composition 
The different scenarios will affect the religious composition of the population. All 
scenarios show a severe decline of the Roman-Catholic population, see Figure 7. Only if 
this downward trend can be stopped by 2031, due to a less pronounced secularisation trend 
(Tl), the Roman Catholics will still have a chance to have a share in the total population 
above 50% in 2051 as shown by the nine upper lines in figure 7. In all the other 27 
scenarios, the Roman-Catholic church would have less than 50% of all religious 
affiliations by 2051, and it could fall below 40% if secularisation rates were to double 
between 2001 and 2051 (the lowest value is 35.6% according to scenario stable 
fertility/Muslim migration/High secularisation). However, it is important to note that 
Catholicism would still be the dominant religion, as no other religion by itself would have 
a share above 35%.  
 
  The projections show in most cases a diminishing share for the Protestant 
population. It could fluctuate between 2.8% and 5.2% of the total population by 2051 (see 
Figure 8). However and contrary to what we have seen for the Roman-Catholic church, the 
Protestant church may witness a rise of its membership—and this in eleven scenarios— 
mostly due to the benefit of a higher share of Protestants in the migrants (above 8%) than 
in the population living in Austria (at present 4%). 
 
The fastest increase will definitely be that of the Muslim population, which was the 
smallest religious group in Austria in 2001 (see Figure 9). From 4% of the population in 
2001, its share could be as high as 26% in 2051—this, however, in case of an exclusively 
Muslim migration by 2031 (Mi), which is rather unrealistic. In twenty-four scenarios, the 
proportion of the Muslim population would not exceed 14% by 2031, and 20% by 2051. 
  
Migration will increase the diversity of religion in Austria as can be seen from the 
share of ‘other religions’ shown in Figure 10. This would be mostly due to the migration of 
Orthodox Christians from former Yugoslavia and Hindus coming from India. Whereas in 
2001, about 5% of the population were observing an “other religion”, they could be as 
many as 10-12% in 2051 if a high or central migration hypothesis is taken into 
consideration (Mh). Only if the migration were exclusively composed of Muslims would 
the share of other religion reach a ceiling of 7% between 2026 and 2051. 
 
The future of the group ‘without religion’ will be highly dependent on the transition 
from the Roman-Catholic, and—to a lesser extent—from the Protestant and Muslim 
groups. The secularised population will be the second largest “religious group” by the 
middle of the century in most scenarios. The scenario lines in Figure 11 can be divided into 
three main groups. If the secularisation rate increases further (Th) and/or if the Muslim 
population starts secularising too, the share of the population without any religion could be 
as high as 28–32%. The constant secularisation scenario gives an intermediate picture, in 
which the group ‘without religion’ will still grow considerably to 20–26% of the 
population. Only if the rate of secularisation were to come to a complete stop by 2030 (Tl) 
this category would stagnate around 10–15% during the 50-year projection period.  
 
    
 
 22
Figure 7. Proportion Roman Catholics in total population, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios 
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Figure 8. Proportion Protestants in total population, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios 
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Figure 9. Proportion Muslims in total population, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios 
 
  
 
Scenarios: 
 
Muslim 
migration 
 
 
 
Muslim 
secularisation
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 10. Proportions Other Religions in total population, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios 
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Figure 11. Proportions Without Religion in total population, 2001-2051, 36 scenarios 
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 The religious landscape of the country will change greatly in the next 50 years and 
this will also have some repercussions at the age group level as can be seen from Figure 12 
(complete results available in Appendix 2) showing the division between different age 
groups representing the young, the working and the old generations. In 2001, there were 
very little differences in the distribution by beliefs across generations. In 2051, if we 
consider the “central” scenario (FcMmTc: Medium fertility/secularisation/migration), 
whereas 56% of the 65+ generation were Roman Catholics, only 43% of the working age 
population will have this belief. The 0-14 will consist of 18% Muslims whereas only 7% 
will have this affiliation in the old generation.  
 
 The differences could even be more extreme if migration and secularisation increase. 
Scenario FsMiTh shows that only 30% of the young generation are Roman-Catholics 
compared to 50% of the old generation. In the same manner, the proportion of Muslims is 
eight times higher in the young age group than in the old one. 
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Figure 12. Age and Religion in Austria, 2001 and two scenarios for 2051 
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Conclusion 
 
The dominance of the Roman-Catholic church in Austria has been challenged during the 
last thirty years. The projections presented in this paper show some interesting results as to 
the future religious composition of the country.  
 
 In our calculations we find that even if the share of Roman Catholics is likely to fall 
below 50% by 2051. Some scenarios even show a decline below the 40% line. However, in 
all cases they will still be the largest religious community in Austria for the first half of the 
twenty first century. The share of the Protestants will remain relatively stable over the 
period, around 3-5%.  
 
 Our projections show that Austria will not have a secularised or a Muslim majority 
by 2051. The share of the population without religion in 2051 is nevertheless highly 
uncertain: It could be as low as 10% and as high as 33%. The Muslim population has 
already experienced a sharp increase, from 1% in 1981 to 4% in 2001, and by 2051 will 
represent 14-26% of the population. Other religion categories will increase their weight in 
Austria as well, to be around 7-12% by 2051. The rapid changes will also provoke 
imbalances with regard to the religious composition of the different age categories. 
 
 The implications of those compositional changes will certainly play an important role 
for the societal future of Austria. We would like to apply further the methodology of multi-
 26
state population projection by level of religion to other countries where similar data would 
be available such as Canada and Switzerland in order to gain some comparative knowledge 
on the future religious composition of those countries.   
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Appendix 1. Methodology for Estimating the Fertility by Religion of 
Mothers 
 
The database for this analysis was the data from Austrian censuses in 1981, 1991 and 2001 
that contained the information about religious affiliation. These data included the 
population by age and sex and the average number of children per woman. The second 
source was the aggregate data: TFR (Total Fertility Rates) and ASFR (Age-Specific 
Fertility Rates). The method described below was used in order to calculate the TFR and 
ASFR in different religion groups. It is based on the decomposition of the aggregated TFR, 
which assures the consistency of the results with aggregate data. First TFR is decomposed 
into the weighted average of religion-specific TFRs and then the age and religion-specific 
relative fertility rates are introduced: 
 
TFR= =∑ ⋅
r
rr WTFR ∑∑ =⋅
r a
arar WASFR ,, ∑∑ =⋅⋅
r a
araar WASFRRASFR ,,  
∑ ∑ ⋅
a r
arara WRASFRASFR ,,  
 
 In this formula r is a subscript of religion group, a is a subscript of age group, Wr,a 
is a weight of religion r in the age a in total population, ASFR,a is an age-specific fertility 
rate in the age a, ASFRr,a and RASFRr,a are Age-Specific Fertility Rate and Relative Age-
Specific Fertility Rate of religion group r in the age a. RASFRr,a could be received from the 
following equation: 
 
RASFRr,a= ∑ ⋅
r
a
rr
ar
WASFR
ASFR ,  
 Where 
1=∑
r
a
rW  
Approximated values of RASFRs are then calculated based on the results of 
calculations made on spreadsheet PAS used by the United States Census Bureau. It uses a 
technique developed by Arriaga for estimating fertility rates based on information on the 
average number of children ever born and pattern of fertility. Patterns of fertility were 
estimated using the information from censuses about the average number of children ever 
born and the assumption that patterns of fertility between censuses are not very different 
from those in census years themselves. Relative fertility rates were used in order to receive 
results consistent with observed TFR and ASFR. This was necessary because in the 
analysis mortality and migration were not taken into consideration. At first the 
approximated numbers of children born to women of a certain age and religion ACBa,r 
were calculated for each age and religion from the equation:  
 
ACBa,r = CEBa,r-CEBa-1,r 
 
where CEBa,r means the number of children ever born to women with religion r and age 
group a. And a-1 means the age group5 years younger. Then the result of this formula was 
used to calculate the RASFRa,r as follows: 
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 RASFRa,r= ∑ ⋅
r
a
rra
ra
WACB
ACB
,
, =
a
ra
ACB
ACB ,  
The presented method simplifies the calculations; the results, however, are only the 
approximated values and method requires at least two strong assumptions: 
- There are no differences in life tables for different religions, 
- There are not very large differences in average number of children ever born to 
mothers at age a and cohort in the same age but one period earlier. 
 
In order to check the consistency, the results of that method were compared with the 
results of calculations made on Population Analysis Spreadsheets (PAS) developed by the 
United States Census Bureau. It uses a technique developed by Arriaga for estimating 
fertility rates based on information on the average number of children ever born and 
pattern of fertility. 
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Appendix 2. Tabular Results of Age and Religion 
 
Table A2. Proportion by age and religion in 2001 and 2051 according to 36 scenarios 
 
Religion  
Year 
 
Fertility 
 
Migration 
 
Transition 
Age-
groups Catholic Protestant Muslim Other Without 
0-14 78.2 4.2 7.4 5.4 4.7 
15-64 71.7 4.6 4.3 6.0 13.4 2001 
65+ 77.1 5.7 0.4 3.0 13.8 
2051 Stable Medium Constant 0-14 40.7 4.0 33.6 12.5 9.3 
 Stable Medium Constant 15-64 42.3 4.0 19.5 11.7 22.6 
 Stable Medium Constant 65+ 55.6 3.3 6.9 7.0 27.3 
 Stable Medium High 0-14 35.4 3.7 34.5 12.8 13.6 
 Stable Medium High 15-64 32.2 3.3 19.6 11.8 33.2 
 Stable Medium High 65+ 49.5 2.7 6.9 7.0 33.9 
 Stable Medium Low 0-14 46.5 4.2 32.6 12.1 4.6 
 Stable Medium Low 15-64 55.0 4.8 19.4 11.6 9.1 
 Stable Medium Low 65+ 62.4 4.0 6.9 7.0 19.7 
 Stable Medium Muslim 0-14 41.6 4.0 30.8 12.7 10.8 
 Stable Medium Muslim 15-64 42.4 4.0 15.8 11.7 26.1 
 Stable Medium Muslim 65+ 55.6 3.3 6.0 7.0 28.2 
 Stable Muslim Constant 0-14 34.5 2.2 50.2 5.9 7.2 
 Stable Muslim Constant 15-64 39.4 2.7 30.4 6.9 20.5 
 Stable Muslim Constant 65+ 55.9 3.4 6.0 7.3 27.4 
 Stable Muslim High 0-14 29.5 2.6 51.3 6.0 10.6 
 Stable Muslim High 15-64 29.7 3.5 30.6 7.0 29.2 
 Stable Muslim High 65+ 49.9 4.4 6.0 7.3 32.4 
 Stable Muslim Low 0-14 39.9 2.4 48.9 5.7 3.1 
 Stable Muslim Low 15-64 51.7 3.4 30.3 6.9 7.7 
 Stable Muslim Low 65+ 62.7 4.1 6.0 7.3 19.9 
 Stable Muslim Muslim 0-14 35.4 2.2 47.3 6.0 9.1 
 Stable Muslim Muslim 15-64 39.5 2.7 25.4 7.0 25.4 
 Stable Muslim Muslim 65+ 55.9 3.4 5.1 7.3 28.3 
 Stable High Constant 0-14 37.4 4.2 36.0 13.6 8.8 
 Stable High Constant 15-64 39.7 4.2 21.5 13.1 21.6 
 Stable High Constant 65+ 55.2 3.3 7.2 7.2 27.2 
 Stable High High 0-14 32.5 4.6 36.8 13.9 12.2 
 Stable High High 15-64 30.3 5.2 21.6 13.1 29.9 
 Stable High High 65+ 49.2 4.3 7.2 7.2 32.2 
 Stable High Low 0-14 42.7 4.4 35.0 13.3 4.6 
 Stable High Low 15-64 51.5 5.1 21.4 13.0 9.0 
 Stable High Low 65+ 62.0 4.0 7.2 7.2 19.7 
 Stable High Muslim 0-14 38.2 4.2 33.2 13.9 10.4 
 Stable High Muslim 15-64 39.8 4.2 17.5 13.1 25.4 
 Stable High Muslim 65+ 55.2 3.3 6.2 7.2 28.2 
 Converging Medium Constant 0-14 46.3 4.9 19.0 12.6 17.3 
 Converging Medium Constant 15-64 43.1 4.1 16.9 11.6 24.3 
 Converging Medium Constant 65+ 55.6 3.3 6.9 7.0 27.3 
 Converging Medium High 0-14 39.3 5.4 19.0 12.6 23.6 
 Converging Medium High 15-64 32.7 5.1 16.9 11.6 33.7 
 Converging Medium High 65+ 49.5 4.3 6.9 7.0 32.3 
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Religion  
Year 
 
Fertility 
 
Migration 
 
Transition 
Age-
groups Catholic Protestant Muslim Other Without 
0-14 78.2 4.2 7.4 5.4 4.7 
15-64 71.7 4.6 4.3 6.0 13.4 2001 
65+ 77.1 5.7 0.4 3.0 13.8 
2051 Converging Medium Low 0-14 54.1 5.3 18.9 12.5 9.2 
 Converging Medium Low 15-64 56.2 5.0 16.9 11.6 10.3 
 Converging Medium Low 65+ 62.4 4.0 6.9 7.0 19.7 
 Converging Medium Muslim 0-14 46.2 4.9 17.2 12.6 19.2 
 Converging Medium Muslim 15-64 43.1 4.1 13.6 11.6 27.6 
 Converging Medium Muslim 65+ 55.6 3.3 6.0 7.0 28.2 
 Converging Muslim Constant 0-14 42.4 3.0 33.2 6.3 15.1 
 Converging Muslim Constant 15-64 40.5 2.9 27.4 6.9 22.3 
 Converging Muslim Constant 65+ 55.9 3.4 6.0 7.3 27.4 
 Converging Muslim High 0-14 35.6 3.5 33.3 6.3 21.3 
 Converging Muslim High 15-64 30.5 3.7 27.4 6.9 31.5 
 Converging Muslim High 65+ 49.9 4.4 6.0 7.3 32.4 
 Converging Muslim Low 0-14 50.1 3.4 33.0 6.3 7.2 
 Converging Muslim Low 15-64 53.3 3.6 27.4 6.9 8.9 
 Converging Muslim Low 65+ 62.7 4.1 6.0 7.3 19.9 
 Converging Muslim Muslim 0-14 42.3 3.0 30.7 6.3 17.7 
 Converging Muslim Muslim 15-64 40.5 2.9 22.7 6.9 27.0 
 Converging Muslim Muslim 65+ 55.9 3.4 5.1 7.3 28.3 
 Converging High Constant 0-14 43.2 5.2 21.0 14.0 16.6 
 Converging High Constant 15-64 40.6 4.4 18.8 13.0 23.3 
 Converging High Constant 65+ 55.2 3.3 7.2 7.2 27.2 
 Converging High High 0-14 36.8 5.7 21.1 14.1 22.3 
 Converging High High 15-64 30.9 5.4 18.8 13.0 31.9 
 Converging High High 65+ 49.2 4.3 7.2 7.2 32.2 
 Converging High Low 0-14 50.4 5.6 20.9 14.0 9.1 
 Converging High Low 15-64 52.8 5.3 18.8 13.0 10.2 
 Converging High Low 65+ 62.0 4.0 7.2 7.2 19.7 
 Converging High Muslim 0-14 43.1 5.2 19.1 14.0 18.6 
 Converging High Muslim 15-64 40.6 4.4 15.2 13.0 26.9 
 Converging High Muslim 65+ 55.2 3.3 6.2 7.2 28.2 
 Half-
converging Medium Constant 
0-14 43.8 4.5 26.1 12.6 13.1 
 Half-
converging Medium Constant 
15-64 42.7 4.1 18.2 11.7 23.4 
 Half-
converging Medium Constant 
65+ 55.6 3.3 6.9 7.0 27.3 
 Half-
converging Medium High 
0-14 37.6 5.0 26.5 12.8 18.2 
 Half-
converging Medium High 
15-64 32.5 5.0 18.2 11.7 32.6 
 Half-
converging Medium High 
65+ 49.5 4.3 6.9 7.0 32.3 
 Half-
converging Medium Low 
0-14 50.6 4.8 25.6 12.4 6.7 
 Half-
converging Medium Low 
15-64 55.6 4.9 18.1 11.6 9.7 
 Half-
converging Medium Low 
65+ 62.4 4.0 6.9 7.0 19.7 
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Religion  
Year 
 
Fertility 
 
Migration 
 
Transition 
Age-
groups Catholic Protestant Muslim Other Without 
0-14 78.2 4.2 7.4 5.4 4.7 
15-64 71.7 4.6 4.3 6.0 13.4 2001 
65+ 77.1 5.7 0.4 3.0 13.8 
2051 Half-
converging Medium Muslim 
0-14 44.2 4.5 23.8 12.7 14.9 
 Half-
converging Medium Muslim 
15-64 42.7 4.1 14.7 11.7 26.8 
 Half-
converging Medium Muslim 
65+ 55.6 3.3 6.0 7.0 28.2 
 Half-
converging Muslim Constant 
0-14 38.6 2.6 41.9 6.1 10.8 
 Half-
converging Muslim Constant 
15-64 40.0 2.8 28.9 6.9 21.4 
 Half-
converging Muslim Constant 
65+ 55.9 3.4 6.0 7.3 27.4 
 Half-
converging Muslim High 
0-14 32.7 3.0 42.5 6.2 15.5 
 Half-
converging Muslim High 
15-64 30.1 3.6 29.0 6.9 30.3 
 Half-
converging Muslim High 
65+ 49.9 4.4 6.0 7.3 32.4 
 Half-
converging Muslim Low 
0-14 45.0 2.9 41.2 6.0 4.9 
 Half-
converging Muslim Low 
15-64 52.5 3.5 28.8 6.9 8.3 
 Half-
converging Muslim Low 
65+ 62.7 4.1 6.0 7.3 19.9 
 Half-
converging Muslim Muslim 
0-14 39.0 2.6 39.1 6.2 13.1 
Half-
converging Muslim Muslim 
15-64 40.0 2.8 24.0 6.9 26.2 
 Half-
converging Muslim Muslim 
65+ 55.9 3.4 5.1 7.3 28.3 
 Half-
converging High Constant 
0-14 40.5 4.7 28.4 13.9 12.5 
 Half-
converging High Constant 
15-64 40.1 4.3 20.1 13.0 22.4 
 Half-
converging High Constant 
65+ 55.2 3.3 7.2 7.2 27.2 
 Half-
converging High High 
0-14 34.9 5.2 28.8 14.1 17.1 
 Half-
converging High High 
15-64 30.6 5.3 20.2 13.1 30.9 
 Half-
converging High High 
65+ 49.2 4.3 7.2 7.2 32.2 
 Half-
converging High Low 
0-14 46.7 5.0 27.9 13.7 6.6 
 Half-
converging High Low 
15-64 52.2 5.2 20.1 13.0 9.6 
 Half-
converging High Low 
65+ 62.0 4.0 7.2 7.2 19.7 
 Half-
converging High Muslim 
0-14 40.9 4.7 26.0 14.0 14.3 
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Religion  
Year 
 
Fertility 
 
Migration 
 
Transition 
Age-
groups Catholic Protestant Muslim Other Without 
0-14 78.2 4.2 7.4 5.4 4.7 
15-64 71.7 4.6 4.3 6.0 13.4 2001 
65+ 77.1 5.7 0.4 3.0 13.8 
2051 Half-
converging High Muslim 
15-64 40.2 4.3 16.4 13.0 26.1 
 Half-
converging High Muslim 
65+ 55.2 3.3 6.2 7.2 28.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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